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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by the government from an order of the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
granting in part, and denying in greater part, a motion to 
dismiss the one count of a 140-count indictment which 
pertains to defendant-appellee Frank Serafini. The count in 
question charges Serafini with six allegedly false statements 
to a grand jury.1 The motion to dismiss challenged all six 
charges. The District Court sustained five of the charges 
but dismissed one. Dismissal of one of the charges was 
required, so the District Court concluded, because, in the 
court's view, the question that prompted the allegedly false 
answer could not support an allegation that the defendant 
had made a "false material declaration" before the grand 
jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1623(a).2 On this appeal, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The charging indictment lists six allegedly false statements. However, 
the District Court's memorandum opinion consolidates two of those 
statements, apparently as a single basis of liability. United States v. 
Serafini, 7 F.Supp.2d 529, 536 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 1623(a) provides that "[w]hoever under oath . . . in any 
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
States knowingly makes any false material declaration . . . shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." The 
essentially equivalent crime of "perjury" -- "stat[ing] or subscrib[ing] 
any 
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addition to addressing the substantive issue -- whether the 
District Court rightly dismissed the contested portion of 
perjury count 140 -- the parties, at this court's request, 
have also briefed the question whether, as the defendant 
contends, the government's appeal should be dismissed for 
want of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
I 
 
This prosecution stems from allegedly illegal campaign 
contributions by Empire Sanitary Landfill (Empire), various 
of its officers and employees, and persons associated with 
those officers and employees. Michael Serafini, defendant 
Frank Serafini's nephew and an officer of Empire, is alleged 
to have funneled Empire funds to various individuals as 
reimbursements, in contravention of the federal election 
laws, for contributions ostensibly made by those individuals 
to Robert Dole's 1996 presidential election campaign. Frank 
Serafini, a Pennsylvania state legislator during the period in 
question, is thought by the government to have received 
some of the Empire money, to have kept a portion of it as 
a reimbursement for his own contribution to the Dole 
campaign, and to have passed the balance on to his 
legislative aide, Thomas Harrison, as a reimbursement for 
a contribution made by Harrison. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
material matter [one] does not believe to be true" after "having taken an 
oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which 
a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that 
[one] will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly" -- is defined in 18 
U.S.C. S 1621. As this opinion reflects, the case law treats "false 
material 
declaration" and "perjury" interchangeably. See United States v. Lighte, 
782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In the discussion that follows we 
analyze the general rules that courts apply to the language of S 1623 -- 
treated the same as perjury under S 1621 -- and then consider the 
defenses to perjury advanced by appellant in this case."). 
 
A close kin to SS 1621 and 1623 is 18 U.S.C.S 1001, which imposes 
criminal liability on any person who, "in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 
Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully ... makes any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation." 
See Brogan v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 805 (1998). 
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When Frank Serafini initially appeared before the grand 
jury investigating these matters, he invoked his Fifth 
Amendment rights. The government then immunized him 
against prosecution. See In re Grand Jury, Misc. No. 95-98 
(M.D.Pa. Apr. 29, 1997) (order compelling appearance and 
granting immunity except for "perjury, giving false 
statement, contempt" or otherwise failing to comply with 
the District Court's order.). The defendant was then recalled 
before the grand jury and testified. Some months later, the 
grand jury handed down a 140-count indictment, charging 
Michael and Frank Serafini, as well as four others, with a 
multiplicity of offenses. Count 140, the only count 
containing charges against Frank Serafini, alleged that he 
had committed six3 separate instances of false material 
declaration while testifying. On Serafini's motion to dismiss 
count 140, the District Court found five of the six charged 
instances to be unproblematic but concluded that one 
question was so framed that the answer could not support 
a false declaration charge. Accordingly, the District Court, 
while sustaining the bulk of count 140, dismissed the sub- 
portion of that count that deals with Serafini's answer to 
the faulty question. The government thereupon filed this 
interlocutory appeal from the District Court's dismissal of 
the sub-portion of count 140. 
 
II 
 
We are met at the outset by the defendant's contention 
that we lack appellate jurisdiction. 
 
The government, as appellant, invokes this court's 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, 
as amended. That statute provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall 
       lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or 
       order of a district court dismissing an indictment or 
       information or granting a new trial after verdict or 
       judgment, as to any one or more counts, except that no 
       appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the 
       United States Constitution prohibits further 
       prosecution. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See supra note 1. 
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       ** 
 
       The provisions of this section shall be liberally 
       construed to effectuate its purpose. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3731. 
 
In the instant case, as noted above, the District Court 
struck one portion of the single count of the indictment 
pertaining to Frank Serafini. Serafini points out that S 3731 
authorizes appellate review of a district court order 
"dismissing an indictment . . . as to any one or more counts 
. . . ." Since the interlocutory order challenged by the 
government dealt with only a part of one count, leaving the 
balance of the count in place, Serafini contends that we 
have no authority to review the District Court's ruling. 
However, this court has held that the dismissal of a portion 
of a count of an indictment is sufficient to establish 
appellate jurisdiction under S 3731 if the dismissed portion 
of the count constitutes an independent ground of criminal 
liability. United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 975 (3d Cir. 
1994). Our holding was expressly based upon the 
authoritative construction of S 3731 announced by the 
Supreme Court in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 
69 n.23 (1978). There, speaking through Justice Marshall, 
a five-Justice majority stated: 
 
       We agree with the Court of Appeals . . . that there is 
       no statutory barrier to an appeal from an order 
       dismissing only a portion of a count. One express 
       purpose of 18 U.S.C. S 2731 (1976 ed.) is to permit 
       appeals from orders dismissing indictments "as to any 
       one or more counts." A "count" is the usual 
       organizational submit of an indictment, and it would 
       therefore appear that Congress intended to authorize 
       appeals from any order dismissing an indictment in 
       whole or in part. Congress could hardly have meant 
       appealability to depend on the initial decision of a 
       prosecutor to charge in one count what could also have 
       been charged in two, a decision frequently fortuitous 
       for purposes of the interests served in S 3731. To so 
       rule would import an empty formalism into a statute 
       expressly designed to eliminate "[t]echnical distinctions 
       in pleadings as limitations on appeals by the United 
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       States." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1768, p. 21 (1970); 
       accord, S. Rep. No. 91-1296, p. 5 (1970). 
 
In so ruling, the Court in Sanabria rejected the narrower 
reading of S 3731 -- namely that the statute by its terms 
simply authorizes appellate review of an order dismissing 
"one or more counts," thereby precluding appellate review 
of an order dismissing only a portion of one count-- urged 
by Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion.4 To be sure, the 
Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 
106 F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1997), has declined to follow the 
Sanabria majority's pronouncement with respect to S 3731: 
that pronouncement was, according to the Tenth Circuit, 
"dictum," id. at 349, and not as persuasive as Justice 
Stevens's reading of the statute.5 But the Tenth Circuit's 
decision in Louisiana Pacific stands alone. The other circuit 
courts that have addressed the issue have been guided by 
the Sanabria majority.6 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Justice Stevens argued that "[t]he statute does not refer to subunits 
of 
an indictment or portions of a count but only to counts, a well-known 
and unambiguous term of art." 437 U.S. at 78.  (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(internal quotations, brackets and citations omitted). 
 
Justice Stevens spoke only for himself. Three members of the Court -- 
Justice White, who concurred, and Justice Blackmun and Justice (as he 
then was) Rehnquist, who dissented, did not undertake to parse S 3731. 
But, since none of the three Justices expressed reservations with respect 
to the jurisdiction of the First Circuit, whose decision the Court was 
reviewing, it would appear that all three, sub silentio, subscribed to the 
construction of S 3731 announced by Justice Marshall for the Court. 
5. Following Justice Stevens's view that "count" is "a well-known and 
unambiguous term of art," the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "the language 
of S 3731 is unambiguous in referring to a count, and the statute's 
purpose to eliminate technical distinctions in pleadings does not give us 
license to ignore the section's plain language." Louisiana Pacific, 106 
F.3d at 349. Nor, the court opined, could the provision of S 3731 
directing that the statute be "liberally construed" mandate an 
interpretation "fundamentally inconsistent with its plain language." Id. 
(citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit thus concluded that "[i]t is not 
mere formalism, nor an irrational result, to require the government to 
plead allegations in separate counts, a minimal burden, in order to 
preserve its right to take an interlocutory appeal of the dismissal of 
such 
counts." Id. 
 
6. See United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 149-150 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1995); United 
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which has had occasion to construe S 3731 subsequent to 
Louisiana Pacific, has expressly taken issue with the Tenth 
Circuit's analysis. Said the Seventh Circuit, speaking 
through Judge Easterbrook, in United States v. Bloom, 149 
F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998), "Sanabria's treatment of 
S 3731 was not dictum. It was no stray remark or aside. It 
explains the Court's rationale and thus is part of the 
holding." We agree.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 788 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 
U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Martin, 733 F.2d 1309, 1310 (8th Cir. 
1984)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Eklund v. United States, 471 U.S. 
1003 (1985); United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 
764-765 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Albertini, 568 F.2d 617, 621 (2d 
Cir. 1977). The position of the Fifth Circuit is not entirely clear. 
Compare 
United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 990 
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993), with United States v. Terry, 5 F.3d 874, 876 
(5th Cir. 1993). 
 
7. Judge Easterbrook's explication of the integral role which the Sanabria 
Court's characterization of S 3731 played in its decision warrants 
quotation (149 F.3d at 653): 
 
       The district court dismissed one theory of liability in an 
indictment; 
       the prosecutor appealed; both the court of appeals and the Supreme 
       Court concluded that S 3731 authorizes such an appeal if further 
       prosecution would not be barred by the double jeopardy clause. 
       Disagreeing with the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that 
       the double jeopardy clause did bar retrial. It was this additional 
       conclusion that led the tenth circuit to call its treatment of S 
3731 
       dictum. But the Court reached the double jeopardy question only 
       because its reading of S 3731 made it dispositive. Had the majority 
       agreed with Justice Stevens about the meaning ofS 3731, it would 
       have done as he urged: it would have ordered the appeal dismissed 
       without turning to the Constitution. Longstanding practice calls 
for 
       federal judges to explore all non-constitutional grounds of 
decision 
       before addressing constitutional ones -- and especially to decide 
       first whether any statute confers jurisdiction. See [United States 
v. 
       Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975)]. See also Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for 
       a Better Environment, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1012-16, 140 L.Ed.2d 
       210 (1998). That is what the Court did in Sanabria. It would make 
       little sense to treat this wise effort to avoid constitutional 
issues as 
       an affront to Article III of the Constitution -- that is, as 
producing 
       only advisory opinions on the statutory issues.... 
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What S 3731, as confirmed by Sanabria , contemplates is 
appellate review of a trial court order excising a portion of 
a count which, if not excised, would offer legal grounding 
for criminal culpability separate from whatever culpability 
might accrue from any portion or portions of the count that 
the trial court does not determine to be deficient as a 
matter of law.8 In the case at bar, the portion of count 140 
excised by the District Court alleged the making by Frank 
Serafini of a false material declaration separate from the 
other false material declarations alleged against Frank 
Serafini by count 140 -- allegations which the District 
Court held to be properly cognizable as a matter of law. 
Given the separateness of the excised portion of count 140, 
we have appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court's 
excision order. 
 
III 
 
A. Serafini's Testimony 
 
Turning to the substance of the government's appeal, we 
begin by laying out, in some detail, the relevant portions of 
Frank Serafini's testimony during his second appearance 
before the grand jury. That testimony began with various 
foundational matters, S. App. at 18-21, which included a 
denial by Serafini of being reimbursed for any political 
contributions.9 The questioning then turned to Serafini's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Some circuit courts have employed the phrase"discrete basis for the 
imposition of criminal liability" to describe the separateness of the 
excised and non-excised portions of a count that is necessary to support 
appellate jurisdiction under S 3731. See Bloom, 149 F.3d at 653, and 
Oakar, supra, note 6, 111 F.3d at 149-50. While recognizing that the 
"discrete basis" formulation has appeared to be a serviceable shorthand 
in certain of the reported cases, we are not at this time fully persuaded 
that it adequately captures the many nuances thatS 3731 is likely to 
present. But this semantic question need not detain us in the case at 
bar: if it is assumed that "discrete basis" is a sufficiently capacious 
form 
of words, the case at bar fits comfortably within it. Cf. Bloom, 149 F.3d 
at 653-54. 
 
9.  
       Q. And did you bring any documents pursuant to the subpoena 
       that required your appearance here today? 
 
                                8 
  
relationship with Empire. S. App. at 22-44. Next, 
government counsel inquired about the contribution 
Serafini had made to the Dole campaign, including a 
question about Serafini's motive for contributing. 10 Counsel 
also asked whether Michael Serafini (Frank's nephew) had 
solicited the contribution and whether any others at Empire 
had solicited contributions from the defendant. S. App. at 
47-50. Counsel next attempted to determine when and how 
Frank Serafini became aware of similar contributions to the 
Dole campaign by other members of the Serafini family. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. I don't have the documents, I don't have the documents with me 
       but the subpoena, because the subpoena didn't require any. The 
       way I read the subpoena, I have a copy of it, all documents 
relative 
       to political contributions you were reimbursed for, and I was not 
       reimbursed for any contributions. 
 
S. App. at 22-23. 
 
10.  
       Q. Now, when we started out you talked to me about documents, 
       that you didn't produce any because you weren't reimbursed for any 
       contributions, that was your testimony. I want to show you two 
       documents here and see if you can identify them. I am going to 
       mark, the first one I will mark as 267 and the second one I will 
       mark as 268. First let's start with 267. Can you identify that 
       document? 
 
       A. That's a check to the Dole for President Campaign. 
 
       Q. And whose signature is on that check? 
 
       A. Mine. 
 
       *** 
 
       Q. What prompted you on that occasion to contribute to Dole's 
       campaign? 
 
       A. Well, prior to this I had also, this, my nephew asked me for 
this 
       check, for this particular check. 
 
       Q. Michael Serafini? 
 
       A. Right. 
 
S. App. at 44-45. 
 
                                9 
  
At this point, counsel focused his questions on a $2,000 
check from Michael Serafini11 to Frank Serafini, inquiring 
whether that $2,000 check was a reimbursement for Frank 
Serafini's campaign contribution.12 When the defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The check in question was drawn on the account of Michael Serafini 
and Melinda Marcotte. However, for the sake of convenience it will be 
referred to as a check from Michael Serafini. 
12.  
       Q. Let me show you a check that has been marked into evidence 
       here, or I will mark it into evidence as 268, it is a check dated 
April 
       25th of `95, on the account of Michael Serafini and Melinda 
       Marcotte, payable to you for $2,000. Now, I will show you -- 
 
       A. I saw this check last time I was here. 
 
       Q. All right. Now, the reverse of the check also has a signature, 
is 
       that your signature? 
 
       A. It is. 
 
       Q. Tell us when you first saw that check and what the 
       circumstances were that you received it under? 
 
       A. I received this check the, probably the 25th and the 
       circumstances, it is just a check, we, we frequently transfer money 
       among our, you know, between ourselves. I would have assumed 
       that this was for the repair of an automobile or something, that he 
       lives in my home, a reimbursement for something. 
 
       Q. Who? 
 
       A. Michael. 
 
       Q. Michael lives in your home? 
 
       *** 
 
       A. I have a home up in Covington that I don't, it was given to me 
       by my father, Michael stays there. 
 
       Q. So, you don't live together? 
 
       A. No, but this check could have been for anything, I mean it could 
       have been, at the time, if I recall, I was fixing his car, his 
       transmission went in his car, I had his car repaired, it could have 
       been for a stereo, it could have been for a bet he had taken, for a 
       bunch of other things. 
 
       Q. It could have been for anything, it could have been for a trip 
to, 
       a reimbursement for anything -- 
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again denied being reimbursed, counsel asked if the fact 
that the check written to him was part of a series of checks 
-- all written on the same day and all for either $1,000 or 
$2,000 to various people from whom Michael Serafini had 
solicited contributions -- would prompt him to change his 
testimony about whether that $2,000 check he received 
was a reimbursement for his contribution. The defendant 
responded, "No. In my mind it was not a reimbursement."13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. Let's me say that. 
 
       Q. -- but my question is, was, isn't it a fact that that check was 
       a direct reimbursement for your Dole contribution? 
 
       A. Absolutely not, in my mind. When he asks me for a thousand 
       dollars for Bob Dole I would give it to him, I don't have to be 
       reimbursed for that contribution. I gave to Bob Dole because I like 
       Bob Dole. 
 
       Q. That's not my question. 
 
       A. The reimbursement, in my mind, was not, this was not a 
       reimbursement in my mind, it just wasn't. 
 
S. App. at 54-56. 
 
13.  
       Q. Now, that check is 431, if I showed you a series of checks 
       starting in the low 400's going to about 450, about 50 checks of 
       which your check is in the middle? 
 
       A. Right. 
 
       Q. And they were all written to employees of Empire Sanitary 
       Landfill, including the people you, family members that you just 
       mentioned, Louis, Frances, Kimberly, John, all written on the same 
       day, at or around the same time that Michael solicited 
contributions 
       from all of those people, would you draw-- 
 
       A. $2,000? 
 
       Q. Yes, $2,000, each check, would that change your testimony 
       about whether or not, in your mind, this was a reimbursement for 
       your political contribution? 
 
       A. No. In my mind it was not a reimbursement. I don't have to be 
       reimbursed to contribute to Bob Dole, a republican candidate for 
       president, I just don't have to be reimbursed for that. 
 
S. App. at 56-57. 
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Counsel then inquired about checks from close relatives 
of Serafini to the Dole campaign and checks from Michael 
Serafini to those same persons.14 After the defendant denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  
       Q. So, it was totally coincidental that you, your father, Frances, 
       Kim and John, were all solicited on the same day for a contribution 
       and all received checks from Michael at or around the same period 
       of time, all dated the same day, for the exact amount, that was all 
       coincidental, that is your testimony as far as you know? 
 
       A. I am not aware of that. 
 
       *** 
 
       Q. That is news to you, under oath, as you sit here today, that is 
       news to you? 
 
       A. That they were all reimbursed, yes, that is news to me. 
 
       Q. No, that they all received checks? 
 
       A. I know my father received a check, my sister I am not sure, I 
       have no idea what she received. 
 
       Q. What about Kim and John? 
 
       A. No idea. My father, I know, received a check, I am aware of that 
       -- 
 
       *** 
 
       Q. All right. We'll start with Frances Serafini, here is a check 
dated 
       April 27th of '95. 
 
       A. Okay. 
 
       *** 
 
       Q. I am going to show you a check from Michael Serafini and 
       Melinda Marcotte account to Frances Serafini for a thousand dollars 
       dated April 25th, check number 430. Okay. The check that was 
       made payable to you was dated April 25th, check 431, consecutively 
       numbered checks, correct? 
 
       A. Different amounts though. 
 
       Q. You said you wanted to see the checks? 
 
       A. Yeah, but I have never seen these checks, I have never, I am not 
       aware of them at all. 
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knowledge of many of the checks he was asked if, having 
been made aware of the existence of the checks, he still 
maintained that there was no connection between his 
contribution and the $2,000 check from Michael Serafini. 
When the defendant again denied any link, the disputed 
colloquy occurred: 
 
       Q: Is there any check that you received that 
       reimbursed you other than that $2,000 check for your 
       contribution. 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Is there another check that you are aware of that is 
       connected to this investigation, to this Dole contribution, 
       other than the $2,000? 
 
       A: Not other than what you have shown me today, no. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Q.  Well, now you have, I am showing them to you. I am going to 
       show you the one for your father. All right. Here is a check on 
Louis 
       Serafini's account, also dated April 27th for a thousand dollars to 
       Dole for President. Right, so, now we have all three on April 27th 
       payable to Dole. Here is a check on Michael and Melinda's account 
       to your father, Louis. For a thousand dollars, this is check Number 
       429. So, now we have check 429, 430, and 431, all coming out of 
       Michael's account for those amounts, correct? 
 
       A. Correct. 
 
       Q. Unfortunately I haven't brought all of thefiles here, but I am 
       going to tell you, I am going to represent to you that I have a 
check 
       payable to Bob Dole from Kimberly and John Scarantino's account, 
       and a similar check from Michael's account, for the same amount of 
       money that they did it, in the same consecutive number that we 
       have just seen here, within the same series of numbers. Now that 
       you are aware of that, I am going to ask you again, in your mind, 
       is there a connection between the check that you received and the 
       contribution that you made to Dole? 
 
       A. In my mind? 
 
       Q. Yes? 
 
       A. The $2,000 check, no. 
 
S. App. at 63-67. 
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       Q: Did you receive any other money, whether by cash, 
       or check, or any other form from Michael at or around 
       the time period you made your Dole contribution other 
       than this $2,000 check? 
 
       A: I can't specifically remember, however, we transfer 
       money back and forth quite often for different reasons 
       and I can't honestly say that there wasn't some kind of 
       transfer, I mean, we do it all of the time. 
 
S. App. at 67. (The disputed answer, reprinted here 
italicized, along with the question that triggered it, was 
referred to by the District Court as "statement 3," a 
convention that, for the sake of convenience and 
consistency, will be adopted here.) After the disputed 
colloquy, the defendant was shown a chart of checks 
written by Michael Serafini and asked if he could explain 
them.15 At that point, the questioning turned to other 
issues. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15.  
       Q. I am going to show you an exhibit that has been marked into 
       evidence as Grand Jury Exhibit 35. This is a chart of checks drawn 
       on your nephew's account, Michael Serafini and Melinda Marcotte's 
       account. It starts at check 426, and it goes to check 464, and 
there 
       is a series of $1,000, $2,000 checks drawn to various individuals, 
       do you see that? 
 
       A. Correct. 
 
       Q. Okay. First of all, let's go down the list and let me ask you do 
       you recognize any of the names, do you know any of the individuals 
       on the list? 
 
       A. My father, my sister, myself. 
 
[Omitted: A discussion of who the various persons on the list were and 
how the defendant knew them.] 
 
       Q. All right. So, the [people on the list] you know basically were 
       people that were affiliated with Empire? 
 
       A. Correct, most of them I know were affiliated with Empire. 
 
       Q. Right, now, your check here, this check 431, right? 
 
       A. Right. 
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The $2,000 check referred to by counsel in the 
challenged question was the check from Michael Serafini to 
Frank Serafini which, so the government believed, was to 
reimburse Frank Serafini for his $1,000 campaign 
contribution. At the time of this colloquy, government 
counsel apparently had no clear idea why the 
reimbursement check was for $2,000 rather than $1,000. 
According to the government, its counsel only later 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Q. Frances is 430, Louis is 429, and Kim and John is 445, do you 
       agree with me on that? 
 
       A. I do agree. 
 
       Q. At least that is what appears on this chart? 
 
       A. That is what is on that chart. 
 
       Q. And the chart indicates, at least, that between check 426 and 
       check 464, there were a series of $1,000, $2,000 checks issued to 
       these individuals -- 
 
       A. Right. 
 
       Q. -- out of Michael's account? 
 
       A. Correct. 
 
       *** 
 
       Q. Right, and do you know for a fact, or do you know that that is 
       [Michael Serafini's secretary's] handwriting, that she made out all 
of 
       the checks? 
 
       A. No, I didn't know that. 
 
       Q. Did you know that she made out all of the checks based on a 
       list that Michael gave her of all of the people that had made 
       contributions to Dole? 
 
       A. No, I do not know that. 
 
       Q. Now, having looked at that chart and seeing how your check is 
       placed in there, is it your testimony that it is totally 
coincidental 
       that your check is within a series of, this series of checks, and 
that 
       it has nothing to do with the Dole, your Dole contribution? 
 
       A. Not in my mind it doesn't. 
 S. App. at 68-73. 
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acquired information that Serafini's aide, Thomas Harrison, 
also contributed $1,000 to the Dole campaign and was 
reimbursed by Michael Serafini through Frank Serafini for 
doing so. Thus, according to the government, (a) the $2,000 
check from Michael Serafini served to reimburse both 
Thomas Harrison and Frank Serafini, but (b) the 
government did not know this at the time Frank Serafini 
answered the challenged question. It is the government's 
contention that -- contrary to the defendant's response 
("Not other than what you have shown me today, no.") -- 
Frank was "aware of " two checks "other than the $2,000" 
that were "connected to this investigation, to this Dole 
contribution." One was a $1,000 check from Frank Serafini 
to Thomas Harrison, and the other was a $1,000 check 
from Thomas Harrison to the Dole campaign. 
 
B. Discussion 
 
When a district court rules that, as a matter of law, a 
question posed to a witness during his or her grand jury 
testimony cannot support an indictment for "false material 
declaration," our review is plenary. United States v. Lighte, 
782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 
In evaluating statement 3, the District Court found that 
the context surrounding the disputed question established 
that the defendant could not have understood that he was 
being asked the "broad, open-ended question", Serafini, 7 
F.Supp.2d at 541, that the government contends was 
intended; accordingly, the District Court concluded that 
statement 3 should be stricken from the indictment. The 
District Court reasoned that none of the questions either 
immediately before or after statement 3 raised any issue 
other than whether Frank Serafini "had personally received 
any other reimbursement checks in connection with his 
contribution to the Dole Committee." United States v. 
Serafini, 7 F.Supp.2d at 541. Immediately before asking the 
disputed question, "the prosecutor questioned Frank 
Serafini whether he received any reimbursement checks 
other than the $2,000 from . . . Michael Serafini." Id. at 
541. After the disputed question, "there was no specific 
follow-up question to demonstrate the breadth of the 
prosecutor's inquiry." Id. at 541. Instead, the government 
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asked whether the defendant had "receive[d] any other 
money . . . from Michael at or around the time period" the 
defendant "made [the] Dole contribution." S. App. at 67. 
The District Court observed that "[the] follow up question 
demonstrates that the prosecutor and Frank Serafini were 
concerned only with whether he received other moneys or 
checks from defendant Michael Serafini, not whether Frank 
Serafini had solicited a check from someone else." Serafini, 
7 F.Supp.2d at 541. The District Court, thus, held, with 
respect to the above line of questioning, that: 
 
       When viewed in context, this single question cannot 
       reasonably be expected to have triggered in the witness' 
       mind an understanding that the government was 
       inquiring of Frank Serafini's reimbursement of Mr. 
       Harrison. The focus of the prosecutor's questions was 
       on Frank Serafini's receipt of the check for $2,000 from 
       Michael Serafini as reimbursement for Frank's Dole 
       Committee contribution. In the context of this 
       questioning, Frank Serafini could not reasonably be 
       expected to understand that the prosecutor was asking 
       a broad, open-ended question regarding checks from 
       third parties to the Dole Committee. 
 
Id., at 541 (emphasis in original). 
 
The government now objects to the District Court's 
rulings on a variety of grounds. The government argues 
first that, in light of what it deems the unambiguous 
meaning of the disputed question, the District Court erred 
by looking to the context within which that question arose. 
The government contends that the District Court would 
only have been entitled to rely on the context had the 
question itself been inherently vague. We find this 
contention unpersuasive. 
 
It is well-settled law that, in instances of some ambiguity 
as to the meaning of a question, "it is for the petit jury to 
decide which construction the defendant placed on the 
question." United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d 
Cir. 1987); accord United States v. Reilly 33 F.3d 1396, 
1414 (3d Cir. 1994). However, "these general rules are not 
without limit . . . ." Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015. One such limit 
is that an "excessively vague or fundamentally ambiguous" 
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question may not form the predicate to a perjury or false 
statement prosecution. Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted). We have said that a question is "not amenable to 
jury interpretation," id., "when it is entirely unreasonable to 
expect that the defendant understood the question posed to 
him," id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the present 
case, the government contends that "none of the broad 
terms used in the question rendered it fatally ambiguous." 
Government's Brief at 29. The question -- awkwardly 
phrased though it is -- might, standing alone , be thought 
as a matter of syntax not to be fatally ambiguous. The 
problem is that, read in context, the question takes on a 
particular meaning wholly at odds with the "broad, open- 
ended" significance the government now seeks to attribute 
to it. 
 
In Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 
1943), the Eighth Circuit, per Judge Riddick, in reversing a 
perjury conviction, admonished that "[a] charge of perjury 
may not be sustained by the device of lifting a statement of 
the accused out of its immediate context and thus giving it 
a meaning wholly different than that which its context 
clearly shows." That formulation has become an established 
principle of law. See United States v. Cook, 497 F.2d 753, 
764 (9th Cir. 1972) (Ely, J., dissenting) dissenting opinion 
reinstated as majority opinion in relevant part, 498 F.2d 286 
(9th Cir. 1973); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 674, 
677-678 (5th Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States , 245 F.2d 
549, 556 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Geller, 154 
F.Supp. 727, 730 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In Van Liew, the 
Fifth Circuit, quoting Fotie, put the matter as follows: 
 
       The seriousness of the crime of perjury and the fact 
       that it turns finally on the subjective knowledge and 
       purpose of the swearer require that the Government 
       not be allowed to predicate its case upon the answer to 
       a single question which in and of itself may be false, 
       but which is not shown to be false when read in 
       conjunction with testimony immediately preceding and 
       following the alleged perjured statement. The oft- 
       quoted [Fotie] rule is applicable here. `A charge of 
       perjury may not be sustained by the device of lifting a 
       statement of the accused out of its immediate context 
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       and thus giving it a meaning wholly different than that 
       which its context clearly shows.' 
 
Van Liew, 321 F.2d at 677 (quoting Fotie , 137 F.2d 831, 
842 (8th Cir. 1943)). 
 
This court endorsed the Fotie rule in United States v. 
Tonelli, where we discussed the proper role of context in 
assessing the meaning of questions posed to a witness 
during grand jury proceedings. 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 
1978). In that case, the defendant, Tonelli, was asked about 
his participation in the placement of certain pension funds. 
Id. at 197. Although initially denying participation in the 
placement of those funds, when further questioning 
revealed that the government included in the notion of 
participation, "recommendations for someone to place any 
moneys in a particular bank," the defendant "explained that 
he had introduced his cousin" to persons involved in the 
placement of those moneys. Id. We found that"by quoting 
a question and answer in isolation, the indictment did not 
accurately represent the statements made by the defendant 
and in ignoring the qualifying definitions used by the 
prosecutor, it was misleading." Id. at 198. Affirming the 
Fotie principle, we held the indictment defective. Id. 
 
As our holding in Tonelli demonstrates, the meaning of 
individual questions and answers is not determined by 
"lifting a statement . . . out if its immediate context," when 
it is that very context which fixes the meaning of the 
question. Id. In the present case, the government 
acknowledges "that the two surrounding questions dealt 
with . . . whether Serafini was reimbursed for his Dole 
contribution." Government's Brief at 32. The government 
argues, however, that the narrow subject matter of the 
antecedent and subsequent questions "does not restrict the 
meaning of the question and answer sandwiched in 
between because that question and answer plainly 
concerned a different topic, the broader category of checks, 
other than the suspected $2,000 check, that may have been 
connected to the grand jury's investigation." Id. (emphasis in 
original). But the text of the "sandwiched" question, read in 
isolation as the government would have it read, hardly 
demonstrates that the question "plainly concerned a 
different topic," let alone serves to define that "different 
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topic." The question inquired whether the witness was 
"aware" (itself a word of somewhat uncertain connotation) 
of "another check that is connected to this investigation, to 
this Dole contribution, other than the $2,000." Two aspects 
of the question are immediately apparent. The first is that 
the question is marked by an awkward appositional 
structure -- "another check . . . connected to this 
investigation, to this Dole contribution" -- likely to obscure 
its meaning. The second is that determining the question's 
meaning cannot be accomplished by reading the question 
in isolation from the setting in which it was asked. In 
asking Serafini whether he was "aware" of"another check 
. . . connected to this investigation," counsel might be 
thought to have been directing Serafini to think at large 
about all he had been asked. However the comprehensive 
phrase "connected to this investigation" was immediately 
narrowed through the awkward appositional device to 
"connected to this Dole contribution," a phrase which 
necessarily called on Serafini to focus on the immediately 
antecedent questions. And that focus was only sharpened 
by the phrase of exclusion, "other than the $2,000," with 
which counsel concluded the question. In undertaking to 
inject into the question sufficient intelligibility so that he 
could reply, Serafini was required by the question to treat 
the question as referentially sequential to questions he had 
just answered. This, in short, is an instance in which a 
court "must look to the context of the defendant's 
statement to determine whether the defendant and his 
questioner joined issue on a matter of material fact to 
which the defendant uttered a false material declaration." 
United States v. Sainz, 772, F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Since the context of the disputed question demonstrates 
that government counsel had been seeking information 
regarding Michael Serafini's reimbursement activities, the 
question cannot support the limitlessly capacious 
construction the government would have it bear. 
 
In the alternative, the government argues that, if turning 
to the context was appropriate, the District Court erred by 
concentrating on the immediate context of the question. 
The government contends that an examination of the 
broader context supports its interpretation of the question. 
Appellant's Brief at 34. In support of this contention, the 
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government points out that: (1) prior to the disputed 
colloquy the defendant was shown several checks from 
 653<!>various persons to the Dole campaign and several 
 
apparently corresponding checks from Michael Serafini to 
those individuals, and (2), following the disputed colloquy 
the defendant was shown a chart listing sequentially 
numbered checks, drawn on Michael's account, all for 
either $1,000 or $2,000, to various individuals, most of 
whom were associated with Empire. Accordingly, in the 
government's view, since "[t]he prosecutor . . . referenced 
numerous other checks that were suspected to have 
reimbursed the conduits for their contributions," "it was 
clear to Serafini, from the context, that the question which 
led up to false statement 3 was not just concerned with 
checks that reimbursed him, but other checks connected to 
the investigation." Appellant's Brief at 34-35. 
 
Close examination of the broader context relied on by the 
government does not, however, lend strength to the 
government's open-ended construction of the disputed 
question. Prior to statement 3, the defendant was shown a 
set of consecutively numbered checks drawn on Michael 
Serafini's account: one payable to the defendant's sister, 
one payable to the defendant himself, and one payable to 
his father. See supra note 11. The defendant was then told 
that the government had "a check payable to Bob Dole from 
[the defendant's niece and nephew], and a similar check 
from Michael's account, for the same amount of money that 
they did it, in the same consecutive number that we have 
just seen here, within the same series of numbers." S. App. 
at 67. Immediately after being shown and told about these 
checks, the defendant was asked "Now that you are aware 
of that, I am going to ask you again, in your mind, is there 
a connection between the check that you received and the 
contribution that you made to Dole?" S. App. at 67. The 
government, in this exchange, was focusing on whether 
Frank Serafini had been reimbursed by Michael Serafini, 
not on whether Frank Serafini had, himself, reimbursed 
others. A similar pattern is evident in the questions put to 
the defendant, subsequent to statement 3, about the chart 
of checks. See supra note 12. That chart was a listing of 
consecutively numbered checks, drawn on Michael 
Serafini's account, allegedly paid out as reimbursements for 
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contributions to the Dole committee. After being shown the 
chart, the defendant was asked whether he recognized the 
names of the payees, and, after a discussion of who the 
various payees were and how he knew them, the defendant 
was asked "Now, having looked at that chart and seeing 
how your check is placed in there, is it your testimony that 
it is totally coincidental that your check is within a series 
of, this series of checks, and that it has nothing to do with 
the Dole, your Dole contribution?" The defendant 
responded, "Not in my mind it doesn't." S. App. at 73. Here, 
again, the focus was on whether Michael Serafini had 
reimbursed the defendant for his contribution to the Dole 
committee. Nothing in the exchange suggests that counsel 
or the defendant had in mind reimbursement checks 
written by Frank Serafini. The issue of whether the 
defendant was cognizant of additional checks -- whether 
reimbursement checks not written by Michael Serafini, or 
campaign contributions not made by Frank Serafini-- was 
never joined. 
 
Finally, the government argues that "[t]he District Court 
. . . attempted to shoe-horn this case into the[United States 
v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1977)], Tonelli line of cases 
by criticizing the prosecutors for not asking more direct 
questions . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 35. The suggestion that 
the District Court erroneously relied on Slawik  is 
unconvincing. Slawik is not cited in the course of the 
District Court's discussion of statement 3. Serafini, 7 
F.Supp.2d at 540-542. The District Court did, however, 
reason that "[t]he prosecutor could have asked Frank 
Serafini whether he had ever solicited or reimbursed 
another person for contributions to the Dole Committee and 
whether any checks existed to evidence such actions." Id. at 
541. Finding that "these simple and straight-forward 
questions, which would have extinguished any potential 
ambiguity, were never asked," id., the District Court 
concluded that "[t]he prosecutor plainly led Frank Serafini 
to understand that he was being questioned as to whether 
he had personally received any other reimbursement 
checks in connection with his contribution to the Dole 
Committee." Id. We agree with the District Court. 
 
In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the 
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unanimous Supreme Court discussed authoritatively the 
basic principles governing perjury prosecutions. In that 
case, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, 
held that 18 U.S.C S 162116 did not reach a defendant who 
provided a literally true but unresponsive answer while 
testifying as a witness at a bankruptcy hearing. Id. at 359, 
361-362. Cf. United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1043 
(6th Cir. 1998) (upholding a perjury conviction, under 18 
U.S.C. S 1621, when the defendant's testimony"can 
reasonably be inferred to be knowingly untruthful and 
intentionally misleading, even though the specific question 
to which the response is given may itself be imprecise."). In 
the course of its opinion, the Court in Bronston  drew upon 
the history of the crime of perjury. First, referring to the in- 
depth Study of Perjury prepared by the New York Law 
Revision Commission and submitted to the New York 
Legislature in 1935, the Court observed: 
 
       The seminal modern treatment of the history of the 
       offense concludes that one consideration of policy 
       overshadowed all others during the years when perjury 
       first emerged as a common-law offense: "that the 
       measures taken against the offense must not be so 
       severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or 
       testifying." 
 
Id. at 359.17 Next, the Bronston Court invoked both 
(Text continued on page 25) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Although decided under 18 U.S.C. S 1621, Bronston sets forth 
underlying principles that apply to any perjury or false material 
declaration prosecution. See supra note 2. 
 
17. In transmitting to the New York Legislature its Study of Perjury, the 
Law Revision Commission recommended amending the perjury 
provisions of the New York's Penal Law with two ends in view: 
 
       The Commission is impressed by the evidence showing that 
       materiality is an inherently ambiguous term, that the courts have 
       given it the widest variety of meanings, that it probably came into 
       the law through misconception, and that by construction it has 
       been largely whittled away in the country of its origin. 
Nevertheless, 
       the fact is recognized that materiality has become deeply imbedded 
       in the judicial and professional consciousness of this state; that 
it 
       cannot, therefore, be easily eliminated from our law. Believing, 
       however, that materiality as now defined by interpretation is a 
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       serious impediment to effective prosecution for perjury, and that 
it 
       discourages even the initiation of prosecutions, the Commission 
       favors the addition of a degree of perjury from which the 
materiality 
       element is eliminated. It believes the that the mere fact of 
classifying 
       the crime in general accord with the seriousness of the falsehood 
       uttered -- at the same time making it plain to the jury than any 
       intentional falsehood in a judicial or similar official proceeding 
is a 
       crime -- will facilitate a finding of guilt for the lesser offense. 
The 
       classification proposed still preserves the chance of conviction 
and 
       severe punishment in an unusual and egregious case. The addition 
       of this second degree will also cover those cases in which false 
       swearing is wilfully and knowingly committed in what at the time is 
       believed to be a material matter and with a deliberate intent to 
       defeat the ends of justice although not technically material within 
       the rules of law. 
 
       The Commission is impressed by the weight and variety of 
       statistical and other evidence adduced for the conclusion that the 
       present maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment is 
       altogether too severe and that this circumstance also stands in the 
       way of effective prosecution. Reduced penalties and the alternative 
       of a fine for the second degree are accordingly recommended. 
 
To accomplish these ends, the Commission submitted a draft bill, which, 
in the spring of 1935, the Legislature adopted and Governor Lehman 
signed into law. L. 1935, ch. 632. 
 
Since 1935, New York's law of perjury has evolved further -- from a 
two-tiered to a three-tiered structure. Perjury in the third degree, a 
misdemeanor, is "swear[ing] falsely." N.Y. Penal Law S 210.05. One 
"swears falsely" when one "intentionally makes a false statement which 
[one] does not believe to be true (a) while giving testimony, or (b) under 
oath in a subscribed written instrument." N.Y. Penal Law S 210.0. "It 
should be here noted that materiality is not one of the requiste elements 
of the crime of perjury in the third degree..." People v. Tyler, 405 
N.Y.S.2d, 270, 275 (App. Div. 2d Dept.), affirmed 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 
(1978). Perjury in the second degree, a felony, consists of "swear[ing] 
falsely" when one's "false statement is (a) made in a subscribed written 
instrument for which an oath is required by law, and (b) made with 
intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official 
functions, and (c) material to the action, proceeding or matter involved." 
N.Y.Penal Law S 210.10. Perjury in the first degree -- a higher degree 
felony -- involves "swear[ing] falsely" when one's "false statement (a) 
consists of testimony, and (b) is material to the action, proceeding or 
matter in which it is made." N.Y.Penal Law S 210.15. 
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Wigmore and Montesquieu. And then the Court turned to 
the pertinent federal case law. "The cases support the 
petitioner's position that the perjury statute is not to be 
loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because 
a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner-- so 
long as the witness speaks the literal truth." Id. at 360.18 
Importantly, for our purposes, the Bronston Court 
continued, "[t]he burden is on the questioner to pin down 
the witness to the specific object of the questioner's 
inquiry." Id. Thus, Bronston stands for the proposition that 
"[p]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the 
offense of perjury." Id., at 362. 
 
Accepting arguendo the government's claim that the 
disputed question was intended as an "unspecific 
question," we nonetheless see the lack of specificity as a 
form of imprecision whose "consequences . . . must be laid 
at the table of the questioner, not the questioned." Sainz, 
772 F.2d at 563. To the extent that, as Chief Justice Burger 
concluded in Bronston, "precise questioning is imperative as 
a predicate for the offense of perjury," that required 
predicate is lacking with respect to the disputed question 
put to Frank Serafini. We conclude, as did the District 
Court, that the context within which statement 3 was 
offered shows that Frank Serafini understood that he was 
being asked whether, in connection with his contributions 
to the Dole campaign, he had received any reimbursement 
checks from Michael Serafini other than the $2,000 check. 
As there is no allegation that -- with the question so 
understood -- the defendant's answer was false, that sub- 
portion of the indictment pertaining to statement 3 was 
rightly stricken. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Among the cases cited by the Bronston Court was this court's 
decision in United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1935). 
19. This court's affirmance of the judgment of the District Court is not 
to be taken as reflecting any view on the issues referred to by the 
government at page 3, footnote 1, of its letter brief of May 8, 1998. Any 
such issue that remains after this case returns to the District Court may 
be addressed by that court. 
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